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1)  Introduction 
The  magnitude  and  importance  of  Afghanistan's  opium  economy  are  unique  in  global 
experience.  The  country  has  been  devastated  by  internal  wars  and  external  military 
intervention  for  decades. These  war  years  have  seen  Afghanistan  emerging  as  the  global 
leader in opium production. This may be explained by the destruction wrought by the war, 
which has resulted in the collapse of economic infrastructures across the country, relegating 
Afghanistan among the poorest economies in the world and at the lowest levels of global 
human  security  and  development.  Despite  international  external  assistance  (i.e.  UN 
Assistance  Mission  in  Afghanistan  -  UNAMA),  and  a  long-lasting  western  military 
intervention  in  the  country  (i.e.  The  International  Security  Assistance  Force  -ISAF), 
unemployment rates remain alarming and less than 10% of the population has access to basic 
services such as electricity. Therefore poverty and economic stagnation, combined with an 
almost collapsing state, have been driving ordinary citizens to take the risks associated with 
the  production,  processing  and  transportation  of  drugs.  Opium  is  a  labor-intensive  crop, 
particularly suitable for a labor-rich and capital-poor country. It generates jobs in on-farm 
casual work (e.g. weeding and harvesting) and in the non-farm rural sector (5.6 jobs per 
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hectare, according to UNODC, 2009a). Thus, opium sustains the livelihoods of millions of 
rural Afghans. 
Yet, it also generates income outside the rural sector. The number of people engaged in the 
opium trade is startling and has been increasing in recent years. In Helmand province alone, 
the estimated number of traders is between 600 and 6,000. Between 2003 and 2009, Afghan 
farmers  earned  more  than  US$  6.4  billion  from  opium  poppy  cultivation,  and  Afghan 
traffickers approximately US$ 18 billion from local opiate processing and trading (UNODC, 
2009a, 2009b). Today, Afghanistan provides 93% of the global supply of opium - and over 
90% of the heroin trafficked into the UK - despite increasing efforts by the international 
community, and ISAF forces, to eradicate the cultivations of poppy.  
The  economic  theory  on  conflict  suggests  two  opposite  relations  between  income  and 
violence. Wage and income shocks increase the incentives for peace through the reduction of 
labour supplied to conflict activities.  The higher the returns to productive activities relative to 
the returns to fighting activities, the higher the amount of citizens' time devoted to peaceful 
activities (Grossman, 1991). This opportunity-cost effect motivates civil wars (Fearon, 2008).  
The contest model suggests that the greater the national wealth, the greater the effort devoted 
to fighting relative to production (Hirshleifer, 1995; Garfinkel & Skaperdas 2007). The nexus 
between income and violence is not so clear cut also in the empirical evidence (e.g. Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon, 2005). 
More recently, Besley et al. (2008) show that positive price shocks to imported and exported 
commodities make civil war more likely; in contrast, Bruckner & Ciccone (2010) find that a 
civil  war  is  more  likely  in  those  Sub-Saharan  countries  where  the  value  of  export 
commodities is decreasing.  However,  the cross-country analysis has a number of severe 
shortcomings, and should be regarded with caution (Blattman & Miguel, 2010). A small and 
persuasive number of works on the Colombian conflict and the drug-violence nexus finds a 
positive effect of coca production on conflict both through a micro-econometric  (Angrist & 
Kugler, 2008) and a macro-econometric approach (Gonzales & Smith, 2009).  Finally, Dube 
&  Vargas  (2008)  find  that  both  a  price-drop  in  labour-intensive  activities  (e.g.  coffee 
production) and a rise in capital-intensive commodities (e.g. oil) have the same effect of 
intensifying attacks by Colombian guerillas. 
Although the link between income and violence is among the most robust in the empirical 
literature,  the  direction of  causality  remains  a  serious  concern.   The recent  literature has 
focused on addressing the causal identification problem, in a search for exogenous measures 
(e.g. Miguel et al., 2004). In 2006, UNODC published a study on the socio- economic and 
psychological  factors  influencing  the  variations  of  poppy  cultivation  in  Afghanistan 
(UNODC, 2006). The survey found that main motivations for opium cultivation were (i) a 
lack of rule of law; (ii) insecurity; (iii) lack of employment; (iv) lack of water and agricultural 
infrastructure; (v) provision of basic needs and (vi) external pressure from traffickers and 
traders. Therefore we do not only question the ability of the Taliban-led insurgency to finance 
war expenditures through the drug economy; we also investigate whether the (perceived) lack 
of security makes illegal activities more profitable. Lind et al. (2011) show that ISAF hostile 
casualties - their tentatively exogenous proxy for conflict- have a significant impact on annual 
opium  production.  However,  a  suspicion  of  endogeneity  (e.g.  the  placement  of  soldiers 
endogenous to opium production and ISAF eradication activities
1) still remains.  We will use 
monthly opium prices at the farm gate level to test these two dynamics.  
Our baseline analysis assumes the endogeneity of the vari ables; therefore we use a vector 
autoregression, VAR, to estimate a system in which both income and violence are functions 
of their own lag, and the lag of the other variable in the system.  Our VAR is augmented 
through an unobserved common factor. We explore whether opium prices induce subsequent 
violence and whether a reverse mechanism coexists. To this end, we have gathered a unique 
dataset with monthly information on opium prices and security  incidents from   15 Afghan 
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provinces over the period 2004-2009.  The geographic disaggregation of our data enables us 
to exploit variations across provinces and over time. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
nature  and  extent  of  the  Afghan  drug  trafficking  in  an  historical  perspective.  Section  3 
describes the data and deals with the difficulties of identifying a clear pattern between opium 
and violence.  Section 4 describes the methodology and   presents our empirical evidence and 
Section 5sums up the findings from the paper and provides some policy implications. 
2)  Background 
The nature and extent of the Afghan drug trafficking have been always shaped by military 
factors. Before the outbreak of war - from 1950s to 1970s - Afghanistan was a sort of rentier 
or "allocation" state, deriving over 40% of its revenue from resources accruing directly from 
abroad, which were used to create basic infrastructure and to pay a police force and army. 
These revenues included both foreign aid and sales of natural gas to the USSR (Rubin, 1992). 
The  rural  community  was  isolated  from  the  central  state  and  dependent  on  agricultural 
production. In the mid-1970s, following the disruption of opium production in Iran, poppy 
production became a significant staple in the country's rural economy. By the late 1970s, 
poppy was cultivated in half of the provinces (Goodhand, 2005). In 1978, the communist 
coup  d'état  and  the  Soviet  occupation  of  the  country  were  accompanied  by  a  continued 
expansion  of  poppy  cultivation.  Opium  was  used  as  a  source  of  funding  for  the 
Mujahedeenan,  an  islamist  guerrilla.  Along  with  an  increasing  production  in  Pakistan, 
Afghanistan developed into a major producer of opium, accounting for more than one-third of 
the global production by the mid-1980s. After 1992, when the Mujahedeen took Kabul, the 
local warlords fought each other to consolidate their economic activities, fragmenting the 
country in a series of sub-conflicts. The further deterioration of the central authority saw a 
rapid expansion of cross-border smuggling and the production of narcotics. In the mid-1990s, 
the disintegration of the country and the dissatisfaction among the population about greedy 
"warlordism" encouraged the rise of the Taliban. From their stronghold in the South, in the 
Kandahar province, the Taliban conquered the country. By September 1996 they had captured 
Afghanistan's capital. 
The  Taliban's  relationship  with  opium  has  been  uneven  over  time.  When  in  power,  the 
smuggling network proved to be an important source of revenue for the new regime, which 
facilitated its export. In 1997 total production was 2,700 metric tons, showing a 43% increase 
over the previous year, with cultivation spreading to new provinces. Through a direct taxation 
on farmers (ushr), a 10% "agricultural tax", they generated about $75-100 million per year 
between 1995 and 2000, to fund a regime without alternative sources of foreign exchange 
(Thachuk, 2007). In 1999 the production peaked at 4,500 metric tons, three-quarter of the 
global supply (UNODC, 2009a). The most damaging drought in three decades struck the rural 
economy,  already  devastated  by  years  of  conflict.  In  the  summer  of  2000  Mullah  Omar 
banned opium cultivation, the reasons for which are still debated - he appealed generically to 
religious  sentiments  to  justify  the  ban.  The  Taliban  decree  (fatwa),  reduced  the  overall 
production, although the cultivation continued in areas outside the Taliban reach, particularly 
the North-East provinces. Also, while the opium ban concerned opium poppy cultivation, no 
policy  toward  opium  trading  and  heroin  manufacture  was  enunciated  and  the  Taliban 
continued to levy taxes on these activities (Buddenberg & Byrd, 2007). 
Following the end of the regime, poppy production returned to previous levels by 2005. Ever 
since their return as insurgents into Southern Afghanistan in 2005, the Taliban - and other 
anti-government forces - have derived enormous profit from the opium trade. In 2007 the 
production peaked at 8,000 metric tons, the highest level ever recorded. Today opium is the 
country's biggest export and one in seven Afghans is reportedly involved in some aspect of 
the trade, with 6.5% of the population involved in growing poppy (UNODC, 2009b). In areas 
such as Helmand, where cultivation is concentrated, this share rises to a staggering 80%. 
Although  the  magnitude  is  subject  to  debate,  the  total  drug-related  funds  accruing  to 
insurgents and warlords were estimated at $200- 400 million in 2006-2007 and at $450-600 
million between 2005 and 2008 (UNODC, 2009b). These estimates included incomes from 
four sources: levies on opium farmers; protection fees on lab processing; transit fees on drug 5 
 
convoys; and taxation on imports of chemical precursors. At the same time, Afghanistan's 
opiate economy has moved towards a greater share of refined products (at present 2/3 of the 
raw opium output is turned into heroin and morphine). This has allowed the Taliban to tax 
higher value-added commodities and other drug-related activities. 
The  relation  between  the  opiate  business  and  the  insurgency  in  Southern  Afghanistan  is 
amplified by the role played by tribalism in both drug trafficking and insurgent networks. The 
strongest overlap between the insurgency, tribal networks and the drug trade is found in the 
Southern and Eastern parts of the country, and extends into Pakistan's tribal areas across the 
Afghan border. 
The literature on economic conditions and warfare surveyed above highlights the role of the 
illegal returns in the decision to fight: an increase in the return to crime increases the labour 
supplied to criminals, therefore increasing the level of violence. Thus, the opportunity-cost 
effect is a main factor motivating civil wars. In principle, in Afghanistan individuals may 
choose  between  opium  cultivation  and  joining  an  anti-government  group  (e.g.  Taliban, 
insurgency linked to Al-Qaeda or non-ideological organized crime).  
Theoretically,  there  may  also  be  a  revenue-appropriation  mechanism,  or  “greed”  effect 
(Collier, 2004), especially on lootable resources (Snyder, 2006): violence might be over the 
opium cultivation and controlling the plantation can finance the insurgency. In practice, the 
narcotic trade seems to be crucial in supporting Anti-Government Elements.  Extortion fund 
AGE through two form of local-levied taxes: not only the above-mentioned ushr, a 10% tax 
on agricultural products, but also the zakata, a 2.5% wealth tax applied to traders (Kalfon et 
al., 2005). According to UNODC (2007), almost all the farmers in the Southern and Western 
regions pay the ushr. Between 2005 and 2008, the total estimated farm-gate value of opium 
produced in those regions was US$ 2 billion. That means approximately US$ 200 million 
paid as ushr by farmers. In the period 2003-2009, UNODC estimated that the total farm-gate 
value of the total opium produced in Afghanistan was almost US$ 6 billion. 2.2 billion went 
to  Helmand  farmers  and  874  million  to  Nangarhar  farmers.  Taliban  also  levy  taxes  on 
laboratories producing morphine and heroin (UNODC, 2009a). To investigate the extent to 
which regional instability and insurgency is fuelled by the Afghan opiate industry, we start by 
exploring our dataset and by providing some descriptive patterns. 
3)  Data and Patterns  
We use monthly time-series data on opium prices and security incidents for 15 Afghanistan 
provinces  over  the  period  2004-2009.  The  provinces  with  available  data  are  Nangarhar, 
Laghman,  Kunar,  Helmand,  Kandahar,  Badghis,  Herat,  Ghowr,  Farah,  Nimroz,  Takhar, 
Badakhshan, Faryab, Kunduz and Balkh. We believe  that it is possible to generalize our 
results to the whole country, given that these provinces are very heterogeneous in terms of i) 
area under poppy cultivation, ranging from poppy-free provinces like Kunduz, Balkh and 
Ghowr to Helmand and Kandahar, the last two accounting for 80% of the production; ii) 
population, from more densely populated areas like Balkh to less densely populated areas like 
Badghis and iii) geographic location, since our provinces cover all the regions of the country.
2 
Monthly prices of opium  were  provided by  the  UNODC  Global  Illicit  Crop  Monitoring 
Programme, Statistics and Survey Section. These price data are based on inquiries in major 
opium producing areas (interviews with some 170 farmers and 160 traders) on a monthly 
basis. They have recorded farmer and trader price of dry and fresh opium. Farmer refers to 
farm-gate price of opium, trader refers to local trading level, dry opium refers to air-dry 
opium, and fresh opium to "wet" opium shortly after harvest  - or kept "fresh" by plastic 
wrapping to avoid moisture loss. Prices are subject to seasonal variations, with lower prices 
during the harvest season. This is particularly true for fresh ("wet") opium prices, as fresh 
opium is available in the harvest period. For this reason we use dry opium prices. We choose 
the farm-gate level because reflects supply factors and risk premia. Data are broken down at 
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the level of 15 provinces. Opium production is also based on data from the UNODC, but 
available online. They provide annual data on the location and extent of opium cultivation 
and  opium  eradication  efforts.  Data  are  based  on  satellite  image  acquisition  (for  the 
methodological aspects, see UNODC, 2010) 
Our  data  on  the  Afghan  conflict  comes  from  the  Worldwide  Incidents  Tracking  System 
(WITS),  US  National  Counterterrorism  Center.  This  dataset  is  event-based,  and  includes 
information on the event type, date and location.
3 
Data  on opium production show that fro m  2004  there  has been tangible progress in the 
increasing  number  of  poppy -free  provinces  and  decreasing  opium  poppy  cultivation, 
especially in the last three years.   In 2004, poppy cultivation was observed in 30 provinces 
(out of 34) and occupied 131,000 hectares. In 2009, opium poppy was cultivated in 14 
provinces, and production decreased by 6% (123,000 ha) compared to 2004. Comparing 2004 
and 2009, opium poppy cultivation increased in the  Southern  and western regions and 
decreased in all the other regions. The production has further concentrated and consolidated 
in the  Southwestern provinces of Afghanistan, which now produce 90% of the national 
production compared to 50% few years ago.  Despite an increase in “poppy free” provinces 
and a slight reduction in the overall crop production, the opium problem remains massive, and 
exacerbated by its concentration in areas where the Taliban are strong. At the same time there 
has been a notable extension of the area under insurgent control, particularly along the restive 
Pashtun tribal belt on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border (see Figure 1).  
By most measures, insecurity in Afghanistan has dramatically increased in the last 7 years. 
This is primarily a result of the insurgency's growing strength. The Afghan National Army, 
the Afghan National Police and ISAF forces are the most frequent targets, but there have also 
been a substantial number of civilian casualties. In 2008 and 2010, many of Afghanistan's 
provinces registered a record number of attacks (Figure 2), ranging from suicide bombings to 
coordinated  assaults  on  military  compounds  to  kidnapping  of  government  officials  and 
contractors.  Much  of  the  violence  occurred  in  Southern  Afghanistan  (e.g.  Kandahar, 
Helmand, Zabol), but insecurity has also spread eastwards, to cover the majority of Afghan 
provinces, such as Balkh and Faryab.  
Although it is commonly assumed that areas of opium cultivation and insecurity correlate 
geographically - particularly by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and by NATO 
-  there  are  too  many  exceptions.  Firstly,  they  fail  to  consider  the  magnitude  of  opium 
cultivation per province. In the period 2004-2009, 80% of the opium was produced in six 
Afghan  provinces  (Helmand,  Nangarhar,  Kandahar,  Badakshan,  Uruzgan  and  Farah). 
Badakshan and Nangarhar aside, the bulk of the production took place in only four provinces 
in Southern Afghanistan. And almost half of all opium was produced in Helmand province. 
The next provinces in order of importance were Kandahar and Nangarhar (see Figure 3).
4  
On the other side, most of the Afghanistan provinces have been experiencing increasing level 
of  violence  (see  Figure  2).  Moreover,  Figure  4  shows  a  number  of  relatively  insecure 
provinces, such as Ghazni, Paktia and Paktika, with a negligible level of opium cultivation as 
percentage of the total. This should be hardly surprisingly since cultivation is more likely to 
occur in remote areas, where the presence of government and coalition forces is weaker or 
totally absent. Thus, the expected punishment decreases. Other areas, such as Badakhshan, 
have a steady level of violence and a decreasing number of insurgency's attacks. Another 
point of caution must be attached to the concept of “poppy-free” provinces. Thanks to the 
eradication activities,  many  provinces  show  low levels  of  poppy  cultivation. However, if 
those provinces currently experience almost no production, they are not necessarily free from 
opium-related activities, especially trafficking and smuggling as it is the case in the Northern 
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cultivation is more than 80% of the country total). All the other provinces have a negligible level of 
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and  western  border  regions,  which  are  crossed  by  important  heroin  smuggling  routes.  In 
particular, UNODC estimates that every year around 110 tons of heroin are exported to the 
European  market,  about  100  tons  to  Central  Asia  (the  majority  destined  for  the  Russian 
Federation), some 25 tons to Africa, 15-17 tons the potentially large market in China, and 
some 15-20 tons to the USA and Canada. Heroin is trafficked through the Afghanistan's 
neighbors,  Pakistan  (40%),  Iran  (30%)  and  the  Central  Asian  countries  of  Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (25%). The remaining 5% is likely to be smuggled into India 
(UNODC, 2009a).  
Secondly, the overall level of opium revenues in the Afghan economy is determined also by 
the opium price (Fugure 5). Since 2004, there has been a notable increase in the number of 
security incidents in Afghanistan in parallel with a decrease in opium prices. This suggests 
that there is a negative correlation between opium prices and violence, although at this level 
of aggregation we cannot say anything about causation. As can be seen from Figure 5, opium 
prices exhibit considerable volatility. This is because opium production - and consequently 
opium prices - has a strong seasonal component. Opium poppy is an annual crop with a six to 
seven  month  planting  cycle.  It  is  planted between  September and  December and  flowers 
approximately three months after planting. After the flower's petals fall away, between April 
and July, the opium, a sap found in the seed capsule, is harvested. The sap can then be refined 
into morphine and heroin. The timing of the price drop usually coincides with the opium 
harvest (UNODC, 2009b). Weather conditions have an impact on yields and hence on overall 
supply,  therefore  influencing  the  prices;  also,  the  final  consumption  demand  in  OECD 
markets might cause changes in prices. We explore an alternative factor affecting the prices: 
the  political/military  situation.  An  important  question  is  to  what  extent  increasing 
criminalisation has induced higher prices through higher risk premia. Do security incidents 
affect prices? Also, we will test the reverse mechanism: does opium foster violence? 
4)  Estimates  
We analyze the relationship between security incidents and opium prices by using a vector 
autoregressive  model  (VAR).  It  provides  a  flexible  framework  for  the  analysis  of  the 
dynamics and interactions between these two variables, mainly because it does not require 
any presumption about the direction of the causal relationship. 
Before  discussing  the  estimation  strategy  and  our  results,  we  briefly  comment  on  some 
preliminary tests. In particular, we check whether the series follow a unit root process, and 
whether the series are cross-sectional dependent and/or spatially correlated. 
We run the 1
st and 2
nd generation panel unit root test by pooling the provinces together.
5 In 
particular we perform the Maddala and Wu (1999) (MW) and the Pesaran (2007) (CIPS) 
tests. The MW test assumes heterogeneity in the autoregressive coefficient of the Dickey -
Fuller regression and ignores cross-section dependence in the data, treating them as nuisance 
parameters.  On the  opposite, the  CIPS test assumes heterogeneity in the autoregressive 
coefficient of the Dickey -Fuller  (DF)  regression and allows for the presence o f a single 
unobserved common factor with heterogeneous factor loadings in the data. The statistic is 
constructed from the results of panel-specific DF regressions where cross-section averages of 
the dependent and independent variables are included in the m odel. The averaging of the 
group-specific results follows the procedure a la Im et al (2003). 
Table 1 displays p-values of the two tests for 6 lagged differences and for two specifications, 
one with and one without a trend. The MW test rejects the null of nonstationarity for the 
security incidents series up until lags 2 in both specifications, whereas it rejects the null for 
the opium prices series up until lags 3 only when we allow for a trend. However, the results of 
the  MW  test  ignore  the  cross-section  correlation  between  provinces,  leading  to  possible 
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erroneous rejection of the null hypothesis.
6 The CIPS test is more reliable since it takes into 
account a likely correlation among provinces.
7 In table 1, the CIPS test performs better and it 
rejects the null of non-stationarity for the security incidents series  up until lag 4 and for the 
opium prices series up until lag 1. 
Failing to reject the null for higher lags does not cause concern, because province -specific 
ADF tests are sensitive to the number of lagged difference terms and this sensitiveness  may 
affect the outcome of the panel unit root test. Further , even if non-stationarity is an issue, 
including  cross-sectional  averages of the variables  in the model  is  a  robust  procedure in 
presence of unit root processes (Pesaran, 2006). Nevertheless, as a precautionary measure, we 
also run the model with the variable in first difference (see below). 
Table 2 displays the Pesaran (2004) CD test for cross-section dependence. Results indicate an 
important  degree  of  cross-section  correlation.  The  security  incidents  series   shows  a 
correlation of 0.35 and the opium prices series a correlation of 0.7. The test rejects the null of 
cross-section independence with a high level of significance. This correlation may be caused 
by common shocks with heterogeneous impact across provinces as well as by local spillover 
effects  between  provinces.  Ignoring  such  dependence  might  lead  to  biased  (and 
asymptotically inconsistent) estimates with inflated t -statistics. There are two econometric 
methods that can address these problems: spatial econometrics and common factor models. 
Both  methods  investigate  spatial  association  ( broadly  defined  as  geographical  or  non -
geographical) in the outcome variable. Spatial econometrics methods heavily rely on a known 
weight matrix to describe the spatial association across groups.  Choosing a reliable weight 
matrix is not trivial: space can assume a variety of forms,  and may not necessarily be based 
on a simple metric distance.  
We specify a weight matrix   in contiguity form , which defines the contiguity between 
provinces where measurements of prices and violence were made. Since data are collected in 
15 locations, the weight matrix is  a 15x15 with zeroes on the diagonal. To check for the 
presence of spatial correlation between provinces, we carry out two customary tests: the 
Moran's I (Moran 1950) tests for global spatial autocorrelation for continuous data, which is 
based on cross-products of the deviations from the mean, and the Gea ry’s C statistic (Geary 
1954), based on the deviations in responses of each observation with one another. Table 3 
shows Moran’s I and Geary’s C statistics and the corresponding two-tail p-values for each 
variable. Both tests  do not reject the null of global spatial independence.
8  Although the 
conclusions of the above tests are valid only with this contiguity matrix, this matrix represents 
the most obvious form of spatial correlation.  
An alternative to the spatial approach is the factor structure approach, which assumes that the 
disturbance term contains a finite number of unobserved factors influencing each province at 
the same time. We use the Common Correlated Effects (CCE) method advanced by Pesaran 
(2006). The approach consists of approximating the linear combinations of the  unobserved 
factors by cross section averages of the dependent and explanatory variables, and then 
running our regressions augmented with these cross section averages.  A main advantage of 
this method is that it yields consistent estimates under a variety o f situations such as serial 
correlation in errors, unit roots in the factors and contemporaneous dependence of the 
observed regressors with the unobserved factors (Pesaran & Tosseti, 2011). 
To see the motivations for this procedure, consider a general model of this form 
  it t i it i i it f x y        =   (1) 
                                                 
6 As Baltagi, Bresson, and Pirotte (2007) point out, the 1
st generation panel unit root tests - which do 
not account for cross-section dependence - can be subject to considerable size distortions. 
7  The  presence  of  cross -section  correlation  is  confirmed  by  the  Pesaran   (2004)’s  cross-section 
dependence test shown in Table 2. 
8 We have also performed the test under the null of local spatial independence (results are not reported 
but available upon request) and even in this case we do not detect spatial dependence. 9 
 
where  t f  represents the unobserved factors, which may influence each unit differently and 
which may be correlated with the  it x . The average across units gives 
  it i t t t t x N f x y ) ( =
1            

  (2) 
  ] ) ( [ =
1
it i t t t t x x y f            

  (3) 
so the  t y  and  t x  provide a proxy for the unobserved factor. The covariance between  t y  and 
it   goes to zero with N, so for large N there is no endogeneity problem. The CCE generalises 
to many factors and lagged dependent variables. Moreover any seasonality is captured by the 
means (seasonality is a common factor). 
We consider opium prices for province i in month t ( it P ) and the number of security incidents 
( it I ), such that 
 




it I P I a P a P          21 11 1 12 1 11 =   (4) 




it I P I a P a I          22 12 1 22 1 21 =   (5) 
 
with  t P  and  t I  being the cross section averages of the opium prices and security incidents, 
respectively. Besides the parameters in the equation, our econometric specification includes a 
constant term and two lags.  
Due to a lack of a large number of months (we only have a  maximum of 67 time series 
observations  for  some  provinces,  and  less  than  30  for  a  couple  of  provin ces), we  do  not 
consider  VARs  in  more  variables. As  a  robustness  check,  we  also  use  a VAR  in  first 
difference. 
To summarize our results we use the Mean Group (MG) estimator proposed by Pesaran & 
Smith (1995). The MG estimator is defined as the simple average of the coefficients 11 a ,  12 a , 
11   and  21  . Given a coefficient  11 a , we compute the MG coefficients and standard errors, 






























The MG estimator can produce consistent estimates of the average of the parameters. 
Our results are reported in Tables 4 and 5. In Table 4 we have a  VAR on security incidents 
and opium prices, with 2 lags and augmented by the CCE; Table 5 reports the same VAR but 
in  first-difference,  as  a  robustness  check. Table  6  shows  the  International  Organization  for 
Standardization  (ISO)  code  used  in  the  columns  of  the  subsequent  tables  to  identify  the 
provinces. In the first column of each table we report the results for the MG estimator.  We 
comment mainly on the signs of the coefficients, rather than their size (i.e the magnitude of 
their influence), since our model is far from being saturated and the signs are the most reliable 
result to discuss.  
Table  4  shows  no  substantial  effect  of  lagged  opium  prices  on  the subsequent  number  of 
incidents. The Mean Group estimator confirms no effects: even though we achieve statistical 10 
 
significance - with a non-obvious interpretation, since the two lags run in opposite directions 
– the coefficients are very close to zero (-0.02 and 0.01 respectively). Notwithstanding the 
numerous surveys covered in our background section, which explain  how the country's drug 
economy generates several hundred million dollars per year into criminal activities, we do not 
find any considerable impact of opium prices - and therefore revenue from illegal activities – 
on the intensity of the insurgency activities across the 15 provinces.  This finding runs also 
counter  to  the  growing  economic  literature  on  civil  conflict,  which  demonstrates  that 
insurgencies have the capability of exploiting drug money for funding, such as the FARC in 
Colombia. In this respect, Afghanistan seems to be an exception.  
The strong and significant effect of the cross sectional average of the number of attacks in the 
equation for security incidents suggests the persistence of unobservable common factors. As 
one would expect, accounting for common correlated effects decreases the effect of the other 
variables in the equation. This may explain the lack of statistical significance of our variables 
in many provinces. 
While we find that opium prices have a negligible impact on the level of violence, there is a 
strong negative effect of security incidents on opium price; the magnitude of the coefficients 
ranges from -0.8 to -1.52, with the only exception of Nangarhar, where it is positive. This 
strong insurgency’s effect on the opiate business is found in particular in the Southern and 
Eastern parts of the country, such as in Helmand, Farah, Kandahar, Konar and Nimruz. This 
is not surprisingly, since in these regions the overlap drug-violence is amplified by the role 
played by tribal networks in both drug trafficking and insurgent networks. And the overlap 
extends into Pakistan's tribal areas across the Afghan borders. The Mean Group estimator also 
points out a negative impact of violence on opium prices. The two lags in the opium prices 
series  negatively  predict  changes  in  insurgencies  by  an  amount  of  -0.54  and  -0.37 
respectively. The fact that violence induces lower opium prices can be explained by two 
simultaneous mechanisms, a demand-side and a supply-side dynamic. On the demand side, 
we should expect Anti Government Elements to fight over the extraction of revenues from the 
opium trade, which in turn causes a disruption of the opiate business and reduces the level of 
demand. In fact, both government officials and anti-government elements have been ending 
up in second-order conflicts over the extraction of revenues from the opium trade in recent 
years. This might explain a conflict-induced disruption of the opium trading, which in turn 
results  in  lower  opium  prices.    On  the  supply-side,  conflict  strengthens  the  level  of 
lawlessness – indeed, opium is more likely to be cultivated where the influence of the central 
authority is weak – and therefore we should expect to observe higher productions in those 
areas and lower prices. 
Common correlated effects show statistical significance and the Mean Group estimator in the 
equation for opium prices confirms the presence of common factors driving the dynamics of 
violence and opium prices.  This result was expected since common correlated effects, such 
as the weather conditions, have an impact on yields and influence the prices; also, the final 
consumption demand in OECD markets might cause changes in prices.  
Finally,  Table  5  reports  the  results  for  the  VAR  in  first  difference:  our  findings  are 
corroborated with no exceptions. The level of revenue opportunities from opium does not 
have a significant effect on the number of violent activities, while violence induces lower 
opium prices. Conflict and illicit economic activities have been always intertwined. However, 
our findings suggest that instability has an impact on the narco-industry, while the opium 
market,  with  all  his  consequences  like  money-laundering  and  collusion  with  government 
officials, does not appear to significantly undermine the security environment. Moreover, 
using a VAR in first difference proves to be an adequate robustness check, which in many 
instances reinforces the significance of the coefficients in the system.  
As  final  step,  we  compute  the  impulse  response  functions  for  equations  (4)  and  (5),  to 
visually represent the behavior of the series. We impose the restriction that opium prices do 
not have a simultaneous effect on the security incidents series (e.g. insurgents need time to 
adapt their strategy to changes in their illegal revenue stream). Figure 6 plots the “Mean 
Group”  impulse  response  functions  up  until  t=10,  by  averaging  the  province-specific 
orthogonalized impulse response functions. Panels (a) and (c) of figure 6 show how the time 11 
 
paths of opium and violence respond to a one-unit shock in opium prices. As shown in panel 
(a), a one-unit shock in opium prices has no simultaneous effect on the security incidents 
series (and this is due to our imposed restrictions) but it causes following security incidents to 
jump  moderately  and  shortly  downward  and  then  to  return  to  the  long-run  values.  The 
moderate jump is consistent with the close-to-zero  coefficients of the two lags of opium 
prices in the security incidents equation in Tables 4 and 5.  Panel (c) shows that a one-unit 
change in opium prices causes a 10 units jump in the opium series and a very quick return to 
zero. 
The effects of a one-unit shock in the security incidents series are shown in panels (b) and (d) 
of Figure 6. A one-unit change in the number of security incidents causes an upward jump of 
1.5 units in the security incidents series.  Again, there is no simultaneous effect of incidents 
on the opium prices, given our restriction; but we find a strong negative effect of violence on 
prices, starting from the first month. This is consistent with the results of the VAR in Tables 4 
and 5. Since the system is stationary the impulse responses decay. 
 
 
5)  Conclusions 
Security incidents in Afghanistan, such as armed attacks and bombings, have been rising 
since 2003. Given the links between anti-government elements in the country and its drug 
economy, NATO forces and the UN consider poppy cultivation as of the main obstacles to the 
long-term security of the region. Opium poppy is a low-risk crop in a high risk environment. 
Even though Taliban insurgents levy taxes on all forms of trade and agriculture, opiates are 
the highest-value product on the market. This paper focuses on the state of insecurity in 
Afghanistan, which is related to the role played by the Taliban-led insurgency and supposedly 
fuelled by the opium trade. 
We argue that both the relationship between violence and opium cultivation and the direction 
of  causality  are  not  at  all  clear  cut.  While  in  many  poppy-free  provinces  the  security 
conditions are worsening, in areas where poppy cultivation is a main activity, security is 
improving. This is because, in principle, drug production has an income effect, financing 
attacks, and a substitution effect, providing an alternative occupation to insurgency activities. 
The  direction  of  causality  is  also  unclear.  Opium  funds  insurgency  through  taxes  on 
production and trafficking, while violence, and the absence of law-enforcement, encourages 
illegal activities 
Using a unique dataset with monthly time-series data on opium prices and security incidents 
for 15 Afghan provinces over the period 2004-2009 and a Panel VAR with multifactor error 
structure  analysis,  we  explore  in  detail  the  interaction  between  income  and  insurgency 
activities. Overall, opium prices do not appear to play a role in exacerbating violence, at least 
not in the expected magnitude and significant, while a conflict-induced reduction in the level 
of opium trading seems to drive the prices; this dynamic implies that violence may disrupt the 
opium trade or increase the level of production through a demand and/or supply mechanism.  
We also find that unobservable common channels prevail in determining how income and 
conflict dynamics interact.   
Since  2004,  the  strength  of  the  insurgency  in  Afghanistan  has  become  stronger  and  the 
transnational threat posed by the conflict more acute. Afghanistan's drug industry is a central 
issue for the country's state-building, security, governance, and development agenda.  The 
opium trade has worldwide consequences. Drugs fund insurgents, criminals and terrorists in 
Afghanistan and abroad. Collusion with corrupt government officials undermines public trust, 
security, and the law, while money-laundering damages the reputation of banks in the Gulf 
region.  Drug  addiction  and  HIV  are  spreading  death  along  opiate  trafficking  routes, 
particularly in Central Asia and Russia. In Europe, thousands are predicted to die this year 
from heroin overdoses, a sub-product of opium. It is therefore essential to analyze the relation 
between the opiate business and insurgency and to indentify a more general pattern among 
illegal activities, such as drug production and trafficking, and violence. 12 
 
We believe that there is an important lesson to be learned: there is a simplified reading of the 
income-violence, and in Afghanistan of the drugs-Taliban nexus. The geographic correlation 
between drugs and Taliban creates the dangerous temptation to merge the war against the 
Taliban  and  the  war  on  opium.  Opium  production  is  usually  associated  with  insecurity, 
conflict and increasingly anti-government violence in Afghanistan, yet opium and violence 
are not intrinsically linked. Certainly in Afghanistan in the past, and currently in other parts of 
the  country,  the  drugs  trade  has  not  been  linked  with  such  high  levels  of  violence.  The 
intensity  of  the  conflict  in  the  South  may  originate  in  a  conjunction  between  politically 
motivated anti-government activity and local opportunistic opium production and trade that 
deteriorated in a spiral of violence, in which anti-government elements portray themselves as 
"protectors"  of  the  security  of  the  rural  population.  But  there  are  other  endemic  factors, 
particularly corruption, which should enter into the equation as well. Our findings would 
recommend  a  more  differentiated  implementation  of  counter-narcotics  vis-a-vis  counter-
insurgency. 
We also contribute to the debate on civil war and the nexus income - violence. Most part of 
the scholarly research on this topic takes a generic approach, and does not recognize possible 
differences  across  regions  within  the  same  country.  We  stress  the  likely  presence  of 
heterogeneity  across  provinces;  this  knowledge  can  contribute  to  the  implementation  of 
suitable  reconstruction  policies.  Moreover,  understanding  how  the  returns  to  crime  and 
violence affect the choice between legal and illegal activities can help the government of 
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Figure 1. The Afghan Insurgent Front. Source: The Rand Corporation  15 
 
 
Figure  2.  Number  of  security  incidents.  Author's  calculation  based  on  records  from  the 
Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, US National Counterterrorism Center, and from the 
UNODC Statistics and Survey Section 
 
Figure 3. Provincial distribution of opium cultivation (percentage). Author's calculation based 
on records from the UNODC Statistics and Survey Section 16 
 
 
Figure  4.  Security  incidents  and  opium  cultivation  (in  percentage  of  the  total).  Source: 
Author's calculation based on records from the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, US 
National Counterterrorism Center, and from the UNODC Statistics and Survey Section 
 
Figure 5. Monthly prices of dry opium at farm-gate level. Source: UNODC Global Illicit Crop 
Monitoring Program, Statistics and Survey Section 
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Table 1. 1st and 2nd generation panel unit root test for security incidents and opium prices. 
 
  Maddala and Wu (1999)  Pesaran (2007) 
  SPECIFICATION WITHOUT TREND 
No. of lags  Security incidents  Opium Prices  Security incidents  Opium Prices 
0  0.000  0.005  0.000  0.000 
1  0.000  0.555  0.000  0.002 
2  0.005  0.797  0.000  0.239 
3  0.140  0.889  0.000  0.846 
4  0.492  0.996  0.000  0.968 
5  0.801  0.997  0.009  0.963 
6  0.970  0.998  0.492  0.998 
  SPECIFICATION WITH TREND 
0  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.002 
1  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.029 
2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.592 
3  0.012  0.000  0.000  0.968 
4  0.326  0.016  0.007  0.995 
5  0.702  0.048  0.140  0.883 
6  0.979  0.226  0.955  0.991 
Null hypothesis for Maddala and Wu (MW) and Pesaran (CIPS) tests: series is I(1). MW test assumes 





Table 2. CD test for cross-section dependence. 
 
  p-value   
Security incidents  0.000  0.350 
Opium prices  0.000  0.696 




Table 3. Testing for spatial autocorrelation of security incidents and opium price. 
  Moran’s I  Geary’s C 
  I  p-values    C  p-value 
Security incidents  -0.06  0.086    1.032  0.669 
Opium price  0.06  0.074    1.013  0.798 
p-values  refer  to  two  tails  test  under  the  null  hypothesis  of  global  spatial  independence.  Sample 
comprises 15 provinces for which we have data for both security incidents and opium price. Weights 








Table 4. Security incidents (Iit) and opium price (Pit) 
  MEAN 
GROUP  BDS  BDG  BAL  FRA  FYB  GHO  HEL  HER  KAN  KNR  KDZ  LAG  NAN  NIM  TAK 
Security incident equation                           
Iit-1  0.02  -0.14  -0.26*  -0.05  0.08  0.17  0.09  0.27**  0.23*  -0.10  0.09  0.24  -0.28**  -0.07  0.24  -0.12 
  (0.05)  (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.09)  (0.16)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.11)  (0.17)  (0.15) 
Iit-2  -0.05  -0.00  -0.76***  -0.00  -0.01  0.04  -0.26  0.21*  0.12  -0.07  0.15  -0.16  -0.18  -0.02  0.29  -0.09 
  (0.06)  (0.14)  (0.22)  (0.11)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.16)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.11)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.13)  (0.11)  (0.24)  (0.14) 
Pit-1  -0.02***  -0.02*  -0.07  -0.00  -0.03  -0.01  -0.03  -0.02  -0.01  -0.03  0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.00  -0.11*  -0.03** 
  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.07)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.02) 
Pit-2  0.01***  0.02*  0.01  -0.00  0.01  -0.00  0.02  0.01  -0.00  0.01  -0.00  0.01  0.04***  0.00  0.01  0.03** 
  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.02) 
ICCE  0.97***  0.03  0.93***  0.65***  0.98***  0.15  0.53***  1.28***  0.98***  3.38***  0.46  1.22***  0.96***  1.66***  0.98***  0.42*** 
  (0.20)  (0.09)  (0.19)  (0.16)  (0.32)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.37)  (0.25)  (0.40)  (0.34)  (0.27)  (0.22)  (0.26)  (0.25)  (0.16) 
PCCE  0.01  -0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01  -0.00  0.00  0.03  -0.01  0.05*  -0.05  -0.02  -0.03  0.03**  0.24***  -0.00 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.08)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.08)  (0.01) 
cons  -0.51  1.53*  2.90  -0.17  0.43  1.86  -0.44  -1.55  2.49  -1.20  5.91  -0.48  -1.01  -4.70**  -12.92**  -0.34 
  (1.08)  (0.91)  (4.42)  (1.58)  (2.66)  (1.29)  (1.07)  (3.05)  (2.37)  (3.26)  (4.00)  (2.14)  (2.08)  (1.87)  (6.00)  (1.27) 
Opium price equation                           
Iit-1  -0.54***  0.82  -0.86**  -0.66  -0.80*  -2.29  -1.61  -1.01**  0.35  -0.87**  -1.44*  -0.41  0.61  1.97**  -1.52***  -0.41 
  (0.28)  (1.82)  (0.34)  (1.45)  (0.48)  (1.84)  (1.02)  (0.44)  (1.13)  (0.34)  (0.84)  (0.67)  (1.15)  (0.87)  (0.57)  (1.37) 
Iit-2  -0.37*  1.85  -0.01  -0.51  -0.78  -0.85  -0.50  -0.79*  -1.70  -0.46  -0.62  -0.29  0.02  -0.44  -0.88  0.33 
  (0.20)  (1.87)  (0.49)  (1.37)  (0.49)  (1.79)  (1.25)  (0.44)  (1.11)  (0.40)  (0.87)  (0.76)  (1.19)  (0.91)  (0.78)  (1.29) 
Pit-1  0.44***  0.85**
* 
0.38**  0.10  0.64***  0.20  0.37**  0.36***  0.29*  0.35***  0.35**  0.48***  0.40**  0.53***  0.47**  0.89*** 
  (0.05)  (0.14)  (0.16)  (0.11)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.09)  (0.17)  (0.09)  (0.14)  (0.11)  (0.16)  (0.10)  (0.19)  (0.15) 
Pit-2  -0.06*  -0.00  -0.26**  0.14  -0.14  -0.02  0.01  -0.16*  0.12  -0.17**  0.04  -0.28***  0.06  -0.01  -0.03  -0.17 
  (0.03)  (0.14)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.14)  (0.08)  (0.13)  (0.10)  (0.14)  (0.09)  (0.16)  (0.15) 
ICCE  0.71*  -0.93  -0.68  0.87  -0.96  -0.50  -1.20  0.72  -2.91  0.68  4.66***  1.04  2.89  4.67**  0.39  1.96 
  (0.55)  (1.16)  (0.42)  (1.92)  (1.06)  (1.36)  (0.91)  (1.39)  (2.11)  (1.52)  (1.75)  (1.21)  (2.00)  (2.14)  (0.83)  (1.48) 
PCCE  0.65  0.07  1.16***  0.35***  0.42***  0.56***  0.45***  0.80***  0.49***  0.84***  1.00***  0.72***  0.98***  0.79***  0.87***  0.29** 
  (8.08)  (0.10)  (0.18)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.14)  (0.10)  (0.27)  (0.09)  (0.28)  (0.11)  (0.25)  (0.13) 
cons  -3.40  7.01  -
30.72*** 
26.99  22.01**  27.85*  10.64  3.08  41.86**  -1.44  -36.99*  -7.17  -46.53**  -
41.64*** 
-12.55  -13.50 
  (7.01)  (12.04)  (9.91)  (19.03)  (8.79)  (15.81)  (8.26)  (11.30)  (20.30)  (12.33)  (20.61)  (9.58)  (18.96)  (15.15)  (19.82)  (11.67) 
N  15  50  19  62  45  45  45  65  56  67  45  45  45  67  26  45 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 19 
 
 
Table 5. Security incidents (Iit) and opium price (Pit). VAR in first-difference. 
  MEAN 
GROUP  BDS  BDG  BAL  FRA  FYB  GHO  HEL  HER  KAN  KNR  KDZ  LAG  NAN  NIM  TAK 
Security incident equation                           
Iit-1  -0.66***  -0.68***  -0.84***  -0.68***  -0.51***  -0.57***  -0.61***  -0.55***  -0.53***  -0.83***  -0.58***  -0.60***  -0.73***  -0.67***  -0.68***  -0.82*** 
  (0.03)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.10)  (0.17)  (0.18)  (0.15)  (0.12)  (0.21)  (0.14) 
Iit-2  -0.36***  -0.27*  -0.91***  -0.39***  -0.12  -0.33**  -0.45***  -0.22*  -0.32**  -0.49***  -0.06  -0.49***  -0.33**  -0.23*  -0.18  -0.62*** 
  (0.05)  (0.14)  (0.18)  (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.22)  (0.14) 
Pit-1  -0.01***  -0.02  -0.06  -0.00  -0.01  -0.00  -0.02  -0.01  0.01  -0.04  0.01  -0.01  -0.02  -0.01  0.02  -0.05*** 
  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.07)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.02) 
Pit-2  0.01  0.02*  0.13**  -0.01  0.00  -0.00  0.02  0.01  0.00  -0.05*  -0.01  0.03  0.02  -0.01  -0.02  0.01 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.02) 
ICCE  0.48***  0.05  0.56**  0.41**  0.21  0.06  0.30***  0.61  0.42*  1.72***  0.20  0.71**  0.22  0.54*  1.07***  0.15 
  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.25)  (0.19)  (0.34)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.39)  (0.24)  (0.44)  (0.36)  (0.30)  (0.25)  (0.28)  (0.30)  (0.14) 
PCCE  0.02***  0.00  0.06  0.01  0.01  -0.00  0.01  0.03  0.00  0.06***  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.12***  -0.00 
  (0.008)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.01) 
cons  -3.58***  -0.39  -6.45  -2.85*  -1.69  -0.04  -1.47  -4.48  -1.16  -
11.71*** 
-1.36  -2.81  -0.97  -3.40  -
14.95*** 
0.03 
  (1.12)  (1.08)  (5.76)  (1.61)  (3.27)  (1.13)  (1.13)  (3.42)  (2.19)  (3.98)  (3.51)  (2.61)  (2.47)  (2.55)  (5.14)  (1.33) 
Opium price equation                           
Iit-1  -0.58***  -0.38  0.25  -0.49  -0.82*  -1.83  -0.88  -0.67  -0.60  -0.48  -1.15  -0.49  -0.10  0.98  -1.45*  -0.69 
  (0.17)  (1.55)  (0.51)  (1.36)  (0.44)  (1.97)  (0.88)  (0.66)  (0.87)  (0.45)  (0.90)  (0.94)  (1.04)  (0.95)  (0.80)  (1.24) 
Iit-2  -0.53***  0.83  0.37  -0.70  -1.17***  -0.86  -0.58  -0.45  -1.61*  -0.15  -1.18  -0.27  -0.27  -0.74  -0.92  -0.26 
  (0.16)  (1.57)  (0.64)  (1.41)  (0.44)  (1.98)  (0.95)  (0.65)  (0.87)  (0.49)  (0.93)  (0.91)  (1.05)  (0.97)  (0.84)  (1.26) 
Pit-1  -0.14**  -0.15  0.21  -0.71***  0.13  -0.51***  -0.08  -0.16  0.03  -0.16  -0.32**  -0.06  -0.36**  -0.17  0.22  0.04 
  (0.06)  (0.15)  (0.23)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.12)  (0.23)  (0.15) 
Pit-2  -0.21***  -0.21  -0.10  -0.28**  -0.34***  -0.38***  -0.06  -0.03  0.00  -0.09  -0.22  -0.41***  -0.31**  -0.25**  -0.31  -0.22 
  (0.03)  (0.15)  (0.23)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.12)  (0.23)  (0.16) 
ICCE  1.37***  -1.11  -0.48  2.38  -1.28  2.19  0.01  2.45  0.93  2.84  0.63  2.08  1.52  6.74***  1.12  0.54 
  (0.51)  (1.20)  (0.90)  (2.14)  (1.00)  (1.50)  (0.78)  (1.95)  (1.67)  (1.95)  (1.96)  (1.57)  (1.83)  (2.18)  (1.18)  (1.26) 
PCCE  0.08**  -0.11  -0.24  0.23**  -0.10  0.24**  -0.01  0.19*  0.03  0.22**  -0.02  0.19**  0.01  0.41***  0.21  -0.02 
  (0.04)  (0.08)  (0.21)  (0.11)  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.05)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.09)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.18)  (0.08) 
cons  -16.02**  12.85  19.53  -35.72*  11.42  -34.57**  -0.78  -31.39*  -7.99  -36.09**  -3.31  -28.52**  -9.63  -
69.88*** 
-24.97  -1.34 
  (6.20)  (11.78)  (20.40)  (18.59)  (9.64)  (14.71)  (7.63)  (17.19)  (15.20)  (17.50)  (19.17)  (13.77)  (17.72)  (19.56)  (19.82)  (11.97) 
N  15  47  18  61  44  44  44  64  54  66  44  44  44  66  25  44 




   
a) Security incidents response to opium prices shock  b) Security incidents response to incidents shock 
 
   
c) Opium prices response to opium prices shock   d) Opium prices response to security incidents shock 
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